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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Much has also been written about the claim that a navigable body of
water must have a terminus at each end.46  In other words, there must
be a point of ingress where one enters the waterway and some other place
of egress where one leaves it. Reflection leads one to the conclusion that,
instead of a separate test, this statement is merely a metaphysical analysis
of the concept of highway. Just as the human mind cannot conceive of a
stick with only one end, so, it seems, a highway must come from one
place and lead to another.
CONCLUSION
This, then, is maritime jurisdiction with respect to water. The pres-
ent test- navigability -is a marked improvement over the older rules
because it reaches the heart of the matter with which admiralty is con-
cerned. It is a practical and realistic standard and through it the federal
courts of this country enjoy the tradiitonal maritime powers and authority.
RICHARD J. CUSICK, JR.
The Right to a Public Trial
One of the fundamental guarantees of individual liberty granted us
by the Bill of Rights' is that contained in the sixth amendment:2 "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a public
trial " The real import of this provision is better appreciated when
we realize that it is through the agency of public trials that the freedoms
most evident to the average individual, those of speech, press, religion
and assembly, are enforced. We have witnessed the failure of interna-
tional organizations to achieve world peace because no provision was
made for enforcement of the precepts of peace. So, too, the guarantees
of freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly would be mere his-
torical mementoes of the Eighteenth Century if some provision had not
been incorporated along with the guarantees to insure their protection
and punish their abuse. The enforcement agency is our system of courts,3
and an integral part of this system is the public trial
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although the civil liberties of man are characterized by many as in-
herent, they are in reality the culmination of a gradual growth having
roots in no one definitive act or proclamation. While we can give exact
"aManigault v. S. M. Ward & Co., 123 Fed. 707 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903); Chisholm v.
Caines, 67 Fed. 285 (C.C.D.S.C. 1894)
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dates for the ratifying of Constitutions or signing of Magna Chartas, the
principles which they promulgate are not inventions of the moment, but
rather a product of the gradual evolution of social thought. Thus, it is
not difficult to understand why there is some disagreement as to the
source of the "public trial" principle.4
Although the Romans are known to have had public trials in certain
cases,5 there is no evidence that the Anglo-American public trial evolved
from the Roman law. Professor Radin feels that its adoption in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence is an historical accident. According to him, it
evolved from the large panels which were part of the early English jury
trial system and was strengthened by years of tradition.6
Whether the right was established as early as 1267, a scant fifty-two
years after Magna Charta, seems to be unsettled.7 However, Sir Thomas
Smith in 15658 and Sir Matthew Hale in 16709 made open reference to
the public nature of the English trial and it is certain that in the Seven-
teenth Century the accused could demand such a trial in England.'0 What-
ever its source, it is well-established that the principle is an integral part
of our common law heritage."
'First ten amendments to the United States Constitution.
'Sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
'The importance of the courts to individual liberty was expressed by Mr. Justice
Davis in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) when he stated, "when
peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no diffi-
culty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the ordinary modes of trial are never
neglected." Later in his opinion, Mr. Justice Davis, commenting on the alleged
right of the military to suspend the right of civil trial in an unthreatened area, said,
if true, republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty regu-
lated by law."
"'Informal commentators do not agree as to when and why the right to a public trial
was first developed. Probably this disagreement is due to the great age of the right
and to the fact that it has long been taken for granted." Shapiro, Right to a Public
Trfal, 41 J. CRIM. L. 782 (1950)
'EsMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE 23 (1913 ed.).
'Radin, The Right to a Public Trzal, 6 TEMP. L Q. 381, 388-389 (1932).
TJudge Froessel in his dissent in United Press Associations v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71,
123 N.E.2d 777 (1954) cites Sir Edward Coke as authority for the interpretation of
the Statutum de Marleberge, 52 Hen. 3 (1267), as including the concept of public
trial. Professor Radin, The Right to a Public Trfal, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381 (1932), says
that Coke made no mention about publicity of trials in the section of his work per-
taining to that period, SECOND INSTITUTE, MAGNA CARTA, chap. 29 (Ed. 1797, 2d
part). Judge Frossel in citing this work, Vol. 1, p. 103, says, "These words .ate of
great importance (referring here to the Statutum de Marleberge), for all causes ought
to be heard, ordered, and determined before the judges of the kings' courts openly in
the kings' courts, whither all persons may resort."
SIR THoMAs SMTf, Dn REPUBLIC ANGLORUM (1565)
'HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW OF ENGLAND 347 (Runnington's ed. 1829)
"Lilburne's Trial, 4 How. St. Tr. 1273 (1649).
U" the right of an accused defendant to a public trial, stems from the deep roots
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As a result of what Professor Radin calls the reverence accorded the
traditional English concepts,' 2 the right to a public trial was incorporated
into the American system. Mention first appeared in a state constitution
in 177613 and later, as the sixth amendment, 14 it became a part of the
Federal Constitution. Today the right to a public trial is guaranteed by
the constitutions of forty-one states,15 by statutes in twoi' by judicial de-
cision in one' 7 and by implication in another.'
The development of the public trial in early England is almost with-
out exception attributed by our courts to the distrust of justice meted out
in secret by the English Court of Star Chamber, the Spanish Inquisition
and the French monarchy's lettre de cachet."9 Apparently the inclusion
of the Court of Star Chamber is not warranted by the history of that
court 20 and Professor Radin feels that the abuse of the lettre de cachet
by the French monarchy could well be the prime motivation.
21
HOW PUBLIC IS "PUBLIC"?
If the word "public" as used in the sixth amendment and comparable
state provisions were construed as an absolute, there would be no prob-
of the common law." United Press Associations v. Valente, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174, 123
N.E.2d 777 (1954), from the dissenting opinion of Judge Froessel. In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948). Bishop ascribes the incorporation of the
right into our system to "immemorial usage." 2 Bishop, NEW CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 957 (2d ed. 1913)
"Radin, The Right to a Public Tral, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381 (1932)
'Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights IX (1776); North Carolina
Constitution, Declaration of Rights IX (1776)
"
4 Ratified in 1791.
'Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kans.,
Ky., La., Me., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.M., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I,, S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wash., W Va., Wis.
"Nev., N.Y.
"Md.
'Massachusetts has a statute permitting the exclusion of spectators in a limited cate-
gory of cases. New Hampshire and Wyoming make no mention of a public trial in
statute, constitution, or decision. Virginia has a statute providing for the exclusion
of all persons whose presence is not deemed necessary.
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup Ct. 499 (1948) Almost without exception
a reference to the Spanish Inquisition, the French lettre de cachet and the English
Court of Star Chamber appears in the decisions concerning public trial.
25 HoLDswoRTH, A HISRORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156 (1924) "Like other courts
of justice it (the Court of Star Chamber) heard cases in public."
"Radin, The Right to a Public Tral, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932) "It may
well be that the thing that so profoundly affected the minds of earnest Republicans
of the Constitutional period was something quite different, that grim emblem of the
Ancien Regime, the lettre de cachet." This document was used by the French king
to order, arbitrarily, indefinite imprisonment of opponents. Professor Radin feels
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lem for the courts to resolve. In nearly all trials there are present others
than those directly interested and taking part in the proceedings, for ex-
ample judge, jury, court officers and witnesses. The public nature of a
trial requires some "disinterested" spectators.22  However, there are sev-
eral well-recognized instances in which it is permissible to exclude part
or all of the public without prejudicing the defendant's rights.23 The
trial need not be held in an auditorium capable of accommodating all
who want to attend. People may be excluded because of the limited
capacity of the courtroom,24 or in order to prevent overcrowding for
health and sanitary reasons and for the purpose of providing freedom of
movement. 25 The trial judge may take whatever precautionary measures
are necessary when, in the reasonable exercise of his discretion, he feels
there is sufficient evidence to warrant a suspicion that there will be open
violence in the court due to the nature of the case, threats of retaliation
against a witness to prevent him from testifying or an attempt to rescue
the defendant.2 6 Persons whose conduct is disorderly or would tend to
interfere with the orderly administration of the court proceedings may
also be excluded .2 1 Minors may be excluded if the trial is of a salacious
nature and likely to produce testimony as to obscene matters deemed
harmful to their moral development.28 If testimony relates to such mat-
that it is likely that Mirabeau's book, DES LETTREs DE CACHET ET LES PRISONS
D'ETAT, concerning the abuses of this document was know to Jefferson, Franklin,
and Silas Deane.
'People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); Neal v. State, 192 P.2d
294 (Okla. 1948); State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 Pac. 565 (1921). Grmmett
v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W 631 (1886) takes a contrary view which would
seem to make a provision for a public trial redundant especially if there is a provision
for a jury trial.
'People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); State v. Smith, 90 Utah
482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
2
"Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W 205 (1911), Common-
wealth v. Trinkle, 279 Pa. 564, 124 Ad. 191 (1924); Kugadt v. State, 38 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 681, 44 S.W 989 (1898)
'Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cit. 1917); Bishop v. State, 19 Ala.
App. 326, 97 So. 169 (1923); Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d
817 (1935); State v. Saale, 308 Mo. 573, 274 S.W 393 (1925).
'Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); United States v. Buck, 24
Fed. Cas. 1289, No. 14,680 (D. Pa. 1860); Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77,
195 N.E. 264 (1934); Maldey v. State, 49 Ohio App. 359, 197 N.E. 339 (1934);
Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 Ad. 53 (1918) The judge may
even require admission by ticket in extreme cases.
'Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People v. Tugwell, 32 Cal. App.
520, 163 Pac. 508 (1917); State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 116 Sol 206 (1928);
State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 130 Ad. 642 (1925).
'Beauchamp v. CahilI, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944); State v. Adams, 100
S.C. 43, 84 S.E. 368 (1914); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462
(1906). Four states, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota and Nevada, have statutes which
provide for the exclusion of minors in such cases.
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ters that the witness or party testifying is prevented because of emotional
difficulties from testifying in the presence of spectators, the judge may,
in his sound discretion, clear the courtroom in order to obtain the testi-
mony.29
This, then, lays the basis for the privilege and its exceptions. The
next problem involves the rights of the accused when he has not been
accorded a public trial, and his case does not fall within one of the ex-
ceptions. In such an event there are two views. They are best exempli-
fied by two cases at the federal court of appeals level, Dams v. United
States" in the Eighth Circuit and Reagan v. United States3' in the Ninth.
The Reagan court held that it was not reversible error to exclude the pub-
lic where the accused could not show he was prejudiced thereby, "or de-
prived of the presence, aid, or counsel of any person whose presence
might have been of advantage to him."32  The court declared that con-
stitutional rights should be accorded a reasonable construction and not
followed literally.33  The contrary view is expressed in the Dais case.34
Here the court held that if the defendant is deprived of a public trial,
prejudice will be implied and there need be no affirmative showing
of harm to the defendant's cause to justify reversal. The court said that
to require the defendant to show prejudice would be, in effect, a judicial
bypass of the constitutional privilege.35
'Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); Green v. State, 135 Fla.
17, 184 So. 504 (1938); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423
(1944); State v. Damn, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W 7 (1933). When the witness is
a child the courts are more inclined to grant exclusion. However, in the dissent-
ing opinion of State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W 342 (1907), the Judge
indicates that in the case of an adult witness there must be something more than
nervousness to justify exclusion.
' 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917)
31202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913)
'Id. at 490. "The only conceivable benefit the defendant might have been de-
prived of by the order of the court in this case was the presence in the courtroom of
a crowd of idle, gaping loafers, whose morbid curiosity would lead them to attend
such a trial."
'Accord, Callahan v. United States, 240 Fed. 683 (9th Cit. 1917); People v. Stan-
ley, 33 Cal. App. 624, 166 Pac. 596 (1917); State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 609, 144
Pac. 784 (1914); Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W 631 (1886)
"Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cit. 1917)
' Id. at 398. "It was urged that no prejudice to defendant was shown. A violation
of the constitutional right necessarily implies prejudice and more than that need not
appear. Furthermore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in such cases for a de-
fendant to point to any definite, personal injury. To require him to do so would
impair or destroy the safeguard." Accord, United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d
Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cit. 1944), expressly over-
ruling the Reagan and Callahan cases in the 9th Circuit; Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App.
59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W 491 (1897);
State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906) In view of the Davs,
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"PUBLIC TRIAe" AND THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUION
The sixth amendment is applicable only to the Federal Government
and in no way limits the power of the states.36 But a vital question re-
mains: Is the right to a "public trial' merely a federal right, or is it
guaranteed to all citizens against state action by the "due process" clause
of the fourteenth amendment? The issue arose in the Supreme Court of
the United States for the first time in 1928 in Gaines v. Washtngton.37
The Court said that even if the fourteenth amendment did guarantee
trials of a public nature in state courts, the defendant in this case had
been accorded one and therefore the issue was moot.38 The Supreme
Court did not answer the question until 1947 39 But in the interim, based
on decisions of the Court concerning other portions of the Bill of Rights,
speculation developed to the effect that the right to a "public trial" could
be infringed by a state court without interference by the federal judi-
ciary.40 But this speculation was in error. The Court held in the case of
In re Oliver4l that the public trial aspect of the sixth amendment is with-
in the due process clause of the fourteenth and is thus protected against
violation by the states, at least in cases of complete denial of the privi-
lege. Having brought the issue of public trial within its purview, it
now remains for the Court to evolve a working principle for testing
whether the accused has been accorded a public trial by the state courts.42
It is entirely possible that all the Court meant here was that a secret trial
Tanksley, and Kobli decisions, the Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits are all in ac-
cord on the "presumption of prejudice" doctrine.
'In the matter of Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 22 (1887). 'That the first ten
artides of Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state govern-
ment in respect to their own people, but to operate on the National Government
alone, was decided more than a half century ago, and that decision has been steadily
adhered to since."
' 277 U.S. 81, 48 Sup. Ct. 468 (1928).
as The order of the trial judge was oral and apparently never executed. Therefore,
from the record presented to the Supreme Court it appeared that the accused had a
fair trial.
iiI- re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948)
,o"The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, does not draw all
the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection." Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 Sup.
Cc. 14 (1937). FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTONAL LAW
587 (1952 Revision) Mr. Frank says, 'The situation thus is that some of the
liberties of the Bill of Rights are also liberties of citizens as against the states, and
some are not The situation is seriously complicated by the fact that the liberties of
the Bill of Rights cannot, under the decisions, be put easily into one category or the
other. Many of them are in an intermediate category, depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular case."
U333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948).
" Such as the "clear and present danger" doctrine utilized in cases involving the first
19551
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violated due process and not that it will hear all cases involving public
trials and formulate a working principle for the state courts.
BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC TRIAL
Granting that the right of a public trial evolved to combat the in-
equities inherent in secret proceedings, and that essentially the right is
solely for the benefit of the accused,43 it is none the less apparent that the
public nature of a trial serves many purposes, any of which is important
enough in its own right to justify the guarantee. In a very large measure
it helps to insure the trustworthiness of testimony, subjectively and ob-
jectively, by insuring the presence of a "conscience in the courtroom."
Subjectively, a witness is less inclined to lie in the face of public opinion,
symbolized by the spectators, 44 in part because of the fear of being
"caught up" by persons present who know the truth or by persons who
hear of the testimony from one who was present.45 The same factors
which insure the trustworthiness of testimony of witnesses act upon the
officers of the court, the judge, jury, and counsel to insure a competent
and conscientious approach to their respective duties and to deter them
from arbitrary action.4 6 Objectively, it provides an opportunity for the
discovery of additional witnesses who may be able to provide important
testimony or contradict false testimony.47
While the above benefits may be characterized as pertaining to the
trial proper and to its search for truth in the specific matter in contro-
versy, the public as a whole derives certain benefits from trials of a pub-
amendment and set out in Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247
(1919).
43 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LiMiTATiONS 441 (7th ed. 1903) "The requirement
of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly
dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators
may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and the importance
of their functions."
"6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940) On the other hand, it is also
true that the presence of certain spectators may keep a witness from testifying for
fear of some of those in attendance at the trial. In Commonwealth v. Principatti,
260 Pa. 587, 104 Ad. 53 (1918) a witness refused to testify, out of fear of retalia-
tion from the Black Hand, until all Italians were cleared from the courtroom.
'Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); People v. Jelke, 125
N.Y.S.2d 244, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 Pac.
62 (1909); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940).
"People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W 995 (1891); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore.
289, 103 Pac. 62 (1909); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940)
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948); Tanksley v. United States,
145 F.2d 58 (9th Cit. 1944); People v. Jelke, 125 N.Y.S.2d 244, 123 N.E.2d 769
(1954); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 Pac. 62 (1909); 6 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940)
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lic nature. First of all, these trials give the people an opportunity to
see how their government functions in enforcing and protecting their
rights and instills in them confidence in and respect for the judicial proc-
ess.48 Secondly, many persons may have a direct or indirect interest in
the proceedings, although not as parties, or may be involved in similar
litigation, and have a right to see how the court does, or will, deal with
such interests 9 Lastly, there is the educational effect upon the public
of witnessing the punishment accorded criminal behavior by the judicial
process.5 o
WAIVER
While the advantages which naturally flow from a public trial cannot
be minimized, it is primarily a privilege "accorded to the individual mem-
ber of the public who has been accused of crime."51  Since it is a right
which belongs to the accused, he has the power to waive it.52  The con-
flict as to waiver demonstrates the existence of a liberal view and a re-
stricted view as to the privilege itself. The restricted view holds that the
accused waives his rights by a failure to make tumely objection to the
exclusion order.53  The liberal courts presume prejudice to the rights of
the defendant and hold that the privilege is not waived by a failure to
object to the exclusion order.54  Now that the Supreme Court has held
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948);-U.S. v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919
(3rd Cir. 1949); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916); 6 WIG-
MORE, EvIDENcE § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940).
" Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B & C 237 (1829); 6 WIGMORz, EviDENCE § 1834 (3rd
ed. 1940).
r Auld, The Comparative Jurspruence of Crminal Process, 1 U. OF TORONTO L. J.
82 (1935).
"U.S. v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 722-723 (3rd Cir. 1949)
' "A defendant may well conclude that in his particular situation his interests will
be better served by foregoing the privilege than by exercising it. To deny the
right of waiver in such a situation would be to 'convert a privilege into an impera-
tive requirement to the disadvantage of the accused:' Umted States v. Sorrentino,
as quoted in United Press Associations v. Valente, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174, 123 N.E.2d
777 (1954).
"If he (the accused), by his conduct, leads the court to believe he is satisfied with
the order in that regard and the court acts -in good faith, and not arbitrarily, it would
seem that, in all fairness and justice, he should be precluded after conviction from
urging for reversal in (sic) order that he invited, or tacitly consented to, by remain-
ing silent. Not having objected to the modified order, we conclude that it was sat-
isfactory, and that his conduct constituted a waiver of any right of his involved."
Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918). People v. Letoile, 31 Cal.
App. 166, 159 Pac. 1057 (1916); Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637
(1896); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
" Wade v. State, 207 ALa. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); Stewart v. State, 18 Ala. App. 622,
93 So. 274 (1922); State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923); State v.
1955)
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that the right to a public trial is protected in state courts by the four-
teenth amendment5 5 it is probable that the Court will take a definitive ap-
proach to the waiver problem as soon as the issue is specifically pre-
sented.56
CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent that the right of the accused to a public trial
carries with it numerous advantages, both to the accused and the public
as a whole.5 7  It is true that trials of a sensational nature will draw peo-
ple whose interests are not wholly dictated by seeing that justice is done
in the courtroom. But it is also possible that the "apparently idle spec-
tator may turn out to be the one person who directs public attention to
acts of judicial oppression which are overlooked by the more seasoned
but sometimes blase professional gatherer of news," or that one of the
curious may "prove to be the unknown witness vital to the defense of the
accused."58 The evil inherent in allowing the sensation seeker in the
courtroom is small in comparison with the good which may ensue.
The inequitable nature of public trial in this country has no relation
to the right itself but rather flows from the forty-nine separate approaches
to the privilege. Since the concept of public trial is so deeply ingrained
in our system of jurisprudence it would be more in keeping with justice
to allow an accused in state A the same rights to a public trial as an ac-
cused in state B. The Supreme Court could effectuate this in the future,
by exercising the same degree of control over sixth amendment cases as
they do in cases arising under the first amendment. The possibility of
such control is apparent since the Oliver"9 decision.
THOMAS S. SCHAITENFIELD
Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906) (The Wade court intimated that
the accused's right to a public trial was so basic that he could not even waive it ex-
pressly.)
'In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948)
Interesting as a problem in logic is the approach the federal courts used in a case
involving four defendants among whom was one Elizabeth Kobli. The trial judge's
exclusion order was carried out over the objection of counsel for Kobli and her con-
vicition was reversed and remanded for new trial. United States v. Kobli, 172
F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949) The conviction as to the other three was upheld since
their counsel stated in the trial court that they did not object to the exclusion order
and they were thus deemed to have waived the right. United States v. Sorrentino,
175 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868, 70 Sup. Ct. 143 (1949).
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what constitutes a public trial in the federal
courts.
'As to the right of an individual member of the public to institute proceedings to
restrain a judge from excluding him from a trial, see United Press Associations v.
Valente, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954)
'United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3rd Cir. 1949)
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup Ct. 499 (1948)
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